

Certainly for the pragmatists human action is a topic of central concern. This concern . . . is focused primarily (though not exclusively) upon one aspect of human behavior: intelligent action, that is, purposive or goal-seeking behavior as influenced by reflection. (10)

[T]he human actor . . . at times comes to need a comprehensive understanding of himself and the world in which he acts—and in attempting to supply this understanding the pragmatists are philosophers (12).

Charles Morris

[T]he pragmatists tell us [that] it is the vocabulary of practice rather than theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can say something useful about truth (162).

Richard Rorty

The authors of the Council of Writing Program Administrators' "Intellectual Work Document" (WPA, Fall/Winter 1998) argue that certain "service" activities associated with writing program administration ought to be regarded as "scholarship" since much of the composition administrator's work "derives from and is reinforced by scholarly knowledge and disciplinary understanding" (92). They list five separate "descriptive categories within which the intellectual work of the WPA can be best considered" (95), and through examples of WPA work within these categories (such as "Program Creation" and "Faculty Development"), the authors clearly illustrate its intellectual merit, showing how it is largely an application of disciplinary knowledge within the WPA's local context. The authors argue

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that such work is indeed “intellectual” and that it should be deemed “worthy of tenure and promotion when it advances and enacts disciplinary knowledge within the field of rhetoric and composition” (92).

However, as many in our field have suggested, “advancing and enacting disciplinary knowledge” often means something very different in composition than it does in other fields. Jasper Neel, for example, illustrates the distinctive nature of composition studies compared to other fields when he explains that

most academic disciplines have a pedagogical mission, but the pedagogy in most disciplines depends on and serves the true research that can and should be done quite apart from teaching. Most academics agree, for example, that research into sub-atomic particles or the composition history of the Dunciad is essential, even if no one can see an immediately practical result from theoretical physics, even if only three people each decade actually read through all the forms Pope’s poem took before he died. (79).

But composition studies is different because, as Neel puts it, “the teaching of writing begins and ends in pedagogy” (79); in composition studies, Neel implies, research “depends on and serves” pedagogy, not the other way around. That is, we undertake our research—often *in the classroom*—in order to find more effective instructional methods. So disciplinary knowledge is often “advanced” in the classroom via teacher research, but since that knowledge is also a means to the end of more effective future pedagogy, it is also “enacted” in the classroom (or in some other instructional environment) through the composition instructor’s work with students and student texts.

The quotes from Charles Morris and Richard Rorty with which I begin this essay are meant to suggest another way of classifying the work we do with students and student texts, for the concern of the pragmatist philosopher, as defined by Morris and by Rorty, can also be deemed the primary concern of the teacher of writing: the promotion of a self-consciousness of human actions, in the form of the specific “purposive or goal-seeking behavior[s]” of writing and reading. As a discipline we have come to see that this self-consciousness—a rhetorical sensitivity wherein a writer takes into account the needs of a reader—is developed best in student-centered classroom, that students learn to write best when they

produce texts while interacting with their instructor and their peers. And, as the quote from Rorty suggests, the “truth” of an effective writing pedagogy, regardless of its theoretical sophistication, is found solely in its being successfully enacted. For the WPA, these pragmatic concerns are made manifest in the promotion of a self-awareness of *teaching* writing and reading among the instructors in our programs—the teaching assistants we train, the disciplinary instructors to whom we give WAC advice, and so forth—as well as in the effective execution of that pedagogy by those instructors. This active, instructional role is one in which a typical WPA spends a good deal of time, and because it is aimed at promoting reflection and self-awareness in others, it is a role that coincides with the active role of the teacher of writing.

I wish to suggest in this essay that this pragmatic concern for self-understanding through *reflection and action* is central to the role of the WPA, and that recognizing these two principle elements of a pragmatist philosophy in the work of WPAs bolsters the argument of the “Intellectual Work Document.” For when we look at composition studies through a pragmatist lens, we see that it is through *reflection* that writing teachers and WPAs *advance* new disciplinary knowledge, and it is through pedagogical *action* that we *enact* disciplinary knowledge.¹ In connecting the active and reflective work of the WPA to pragmatist philosophy, I wish to offer this essay as a supplement to the “Intellectual Work Document.” As I describe the tenets of pragmatism more fully, I will also draw upon another work with a purpose similar to that of the “Intellectual Work Document”: Louise Wetherbee Phelps’s *Composition as a Human Science*. The pragmatist’s interest in promoting self-awareness coincides with what Phelps calls “human science,” which, according to Calvin O. Schrag, is a science in which “the investigatable data are human agents,” and in which the issues of particular interest are “human actions, motives, purposes, and concerns which directly inform the self-understanding of the agents . . . under consideration” (qtd. in Phelps 25). Seeing the work of WPAs as the embodiment of a pragmatist philosophy, as a “human science,” provides another way to distance it from the label of mere service.

Composition Pedagogy as Experimental Praxis

As John Patrick Diggins puts it, pragmatism is a philosophy that seeks to show us “not what to think but how to think and how to move confidently ahead instead of dwelling behind in a metaphysical wondersickness” (21).

And as James A. Mackin explains, the distinctive nature of pragmatist philosophy requires that we understand terms like “knowledge” in a slightly different way:

For the pragmatist, the knower is an agent, not merely a spectator. Knowing is an act of inquiry performed by the agent for the purpose of changing an indeterminate situation into a more determinate one. The problem that interests the pragmatist is not how we know or how we know that we know but rather what methods will best solve the problems that occasioned our need to know. (279-80)

Because it is concerned with “how to think” and with “methods” of problem solving, pragmatism is a philosophical system that views “knowledge” not as something to be possessed but rather as something to be enacted. Accordingly, John Dewey defines an essential feature of philosophical pragmatism as “maintain[ing] the continuity of knowing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment” (*Democracy* 344). Put another way, “knowledge” refers only to “that which has been organized into our disposition so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live” (344). This way of defining knowledge is ideally suited to the discipline of composition studies because what students “know” after taking a composition class is not primarily some discreet set of facts; instead they “know” an *activity*, and that activity certainly has the power to “adapt the environment to [their] needs,” whether those needs are to express important thoughts, to work through problems, or to clarify ideas. George Herbert Mead, another pragmatist and a contemporary of Dewey’s, states that “knowledge is an expression of the intelligence by which animals meet the problems with which life surrounds them” (384). Rorty would say that Mead, by virtue of his defining knowledge in relation to the activity of meeting and solving problems, is speaking in “the vocabulary . . . of action rather than contemplation” (162).² Likewise, for the students in our composition classes, the evidence that they are good writers—that they have “knowledge” of writing—is in the way they actually “meet the problems” of the writing assignments they face. Proof of their knowledge is found in how well they undertake the complex task of writing.

Dewey and Mead were key figures in an educational reform movement that took place during the first few decades of this century, and

the centerpiece of the reforms they championed was the experimental or scientific method. Dissatisfied with the traditional, teacher-centered instructional paradigm of the day, these educators theorized and developed a social, student-centered pedagogy that was in keeping with the participatory ideals of a democratic citizenry. Darnell Rucker explains the aim of Deweyan progressive pedagogy as follows: “Awareness, capacity, and ways of doing are cultivated by leading the child into scientific inquiry, in the sense that ‘scientific’ is opposed to authoritarian” (99). In order to engage students in scientific activity, Dewey and his pragmatist colleagues developed a student-centered environment that provided learners with “firsthand experience and a problem as the focus of effort” (Rucker 99; see also Mead 118). As Phelps notes, composition instruction partakes of this same method, whereby student writing is the “problem” that becomes the focus of the combined efforts of writers, their peers, and the instructor (70-76). In the case of the WPA, it is not the writing of a single student that is the focus of effort, but that of the local population of students. And in tackling this “problem,” the efforts of the WPA take the form of the sort of descriptive categories supplied in the WPA “Intellectual Work Document”—Program Creation, Curriculum Development, Textual Production, and so forth. That these categories are stated as *activities* is not a coincidence, I am arguing.

As Hephzibah Roskelly and Kate Ronald explain, “pragmatism is a method of making ideas real by following their outcomes, by understanding how meaning connects to practical use” (83). Experience—as exemplified by the scientific method—holds a central place in pragmatist thought. But as John P. Murphy explains, pragmatists like Dewey possessed a much fuller conception of the term “experience”: unlike the empiricists who “took experience to be a sequence of ideas or sensations that are *of*, but not *in*, nature,” Dewey defined experience as “familiarity with a matter of practical concern, based on repeated past acquaintance or performance” (Murphy 64). In connecting the “truth” or “reality” of something to the human experience of that thing, pragmatists are rejecting the notion of a Platonic “reality” beyond the physical or experiential realms (Rorty 160-64). Truth isn’t something that simply *is*; instead, truth *is experienced*. As Rorty puts it, pragmatists believe that “‘truth’ is just the name of a property which all true statements share” (xiii). A result of this anti-essentialist thinking is that pragmatists prefer to see the world “as *ours* rather than as *nature’s*, [as] *shaped* rather than *found*” (166; original emphasis). And different people (and groups of people) are free to shape or construct their worlds, their

communities, in different ways, choosing from among various alternative means and ends. This same form of social-constructionist thinking is apparent in the work of WPAs: from one school to the next, composition programs and curricula are developed in innumerable ways, depending upon the local conditions in place. There exists no single "correct" way to teach writing or to construct a writing curriculum, so WPAs attempt to produce the best possible curriculum within their local contexts, taking into account such particulars as the dominant philosophy of composing adhered to, the available teaching staff, as well as countless other ingredients of an institution's culture. And just as pragmatists believe that the test of truth is in experience, the test of a writing program's effectiveness is in the way it meets the given goals of that program—the student outcomes regarding writing, reading, and thinking skills.

Drawing upon the ideas of Dewey and other pragmatists, Phelps proposes that the very act of teaching composition should be considered an intellectual endeavor because "it is *experimental* in the Deweyan sense" (79; original emphasis). That is, it follows the methods of science by foregrounding first-hand experience (composing) and focused reflection on that experience (208-10). *Teaching* composition, she argues, is like the act of composing itself—it is a dynamic activity undertaken in a self-reflective manner. It is a "praxis," Phelps says, "that *applies* organized inquiry (research and theory) and personal reflection in order to help the developing person move through literacy toward reflection" (71; original emphasis). As the authors of the WPA "Intellectual Work Document" suggest, the work of a WPA is likewise a praxis, one that draws both upon the organized body of knowledge generated by the field of rhetoric and composition and upon the WPA's personal experience within a local context, the aim of which is to develop the most effective literacy instruction within that context by advancing and enacting that disciplinary knowledge.

Just as the ancients viewed the concept of "praxis," with its concern for practical action, as superior to mere philosophizing, Dewey and his fellow pragmatists likewise believed that only an education that stressed personal experience and reflection can serve as a tool for social change. The ability to reflect, Dewey believed, is the "only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live" (*Experience* 88). The centrality of reflection to the experimental method is apparent in Dewey's definition of "reflection" as "the reconstruction or reorganization of experience" (*Democracy* 76; see

also *Experience* 87). Reflecting upon one's experiences, he insists, "adds to the meaning of experience . . . [and] increases [one's] ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (*Democracy* 76).

Just as Phelps has pointed out the centrality of first-hand experience and reflection to composition instruction, so has Erika Lindemann, whose description of the steps in the process of teaching composition are likewise in keeping with Dewey's interest in reflection. "Teaching, like composing, is a process of communication characterized by rhetorical choices," Lindemann explains. "It requires planning, execution, and review" (248). Enacting the social pedagogy of the composition classroom, unlike the more teacher-centered pedagogy of other disciplines, she adds, requires "making adjustments, sometimes from one moment to the next, if our audience or subject matter requires them" (248). Phelps, too, notes that composition instruction, because it requires making these constant adjustments, is usefully understood as "a complex nested set of dialogues" occurring between teacher and students and the organized set of data (Theory) we have at our disposal as professional teachers of writing (214). The concern for an understanding of the *immediate context* in which one is acting, as the first quote from Morris at the start of this essay suggests, is central to pragmatist thinking. And a self-reflective understanding of *how one acts* within that context, as the second quote suggests, is also key to pragmatism. Phelps's purpose is generally to help us understand this second concern, to reveal the complicated and intellectual nature of *teaching* composition. Likewise, the purpose of the "Intellectual Work Document" is to reveal the complicated and intellectual nature of WPA work. Teachers of writing, Phelps says, are constantly immersed in "situation[s] in which ends (what is to be taught or learned, its effects on the student) are not predetermined but are constantly shaped by means and context, so that no prescriptions are possible" (215). The same can be said for the instructional work of WPAs.

Because of the sorts of adjustments that are required of the teacher in such a student-centered pedagogy, we can view composition instruction, as Dewey might, as a form of "experimenting" or "laboring"; it possesses an *active*, dialogic quality that teaching in other disciplines typically cannot claim, a quality that marks the composition classroom as a "laboratory" for Phelps's "human science." Certainly, the teaching that occurs in other disciplines—especially those schools that boast WAC programs—*isn't* always undertaken via lectures in a teacher-centered fashion. The point, though, is that instruction in composition is *almost never* undertaken in that

way; in almost every facet, composition instruction follows what Dewey calls "the method of intelligence," which is dynamic, dialogic, and inquiry-oriented, rather than the more prescribed and monologic "doctrinal method" (qtd. in Roskelly and Ronald 85). And when we see the job of the WPA as a particular form of instruction in composition—instruction that includes teacher training classes, faculty development workshops, holistic scoring sessions, and other such activities—we can illustrate another "complex, nested set of dialogues" that occurs between the WPA, the instructors within that program, and disciplinary theory.

The WPA as Pragmatist

I have been suggesting so far that the WPA serves, in the completion of a portion of his or her duties, as a type of composition teacher, one who performs a similar sort of "experimental," context-driven instruction but on a different scale, instructing teachers and teaching assistants within the English Department and providing WAC support for instructors in the disciplines, for example. And along with that similar instruction—what the authors of the WPA "Intellectual Work Document" would classify as "Faculty Development"—comes a similar pragmatic purpose: to promote a self-awareness of one's actions (the teaching of writing) through opportunities for reflection. If we consider pragmatism's focus on action and reflection, the WPA "Intellectual Work Document" does an excellent job illustrating the sorts of *action* a typical WPA undertakes. But what of reflection? What opportunities does the WPA-as-pragmatist have for reflection? And, more importantly, in what ways can the WPA *encourage* reflection in those he or she instructs and oversees? By way of illustrating how a WPA's activities might be seen more directly from a pragmatist perspective, I want to provide an analysis of an essay that shows its author engaged in action and reflection in the course of an activity that would probably fall under the heading of "Program Creation" or "Curricular Design" in the WPA document. I provide this analysis to suggest that the WPA's pragmatist mission can be realized even in activities that aren't overtly "instructional," that opportunities to promote reflection and self-awareness are by-products of nearly everything the WPA does.

The essay I have in mind is Geoffrey Chase's "Redefining Composition, Managing Change, and the Role of the WPA." Of particular interest is the way Chase foregrounds in his essay a concern for the "local conditions" of the composition program he directs. Although this concern for the local

seems like a given for anything written by a WPA about his or her program, it is the fact that Chase highlights the local conditions as one of the "host of complex factors" he must consider that makes his essay ripe for a pragmatist analysis. When Chase says that performing a programmatic self-analysis requires that those involved "think about the *local conditions* at our institutions, evaluate the *internal coherence* of our programs, and consider the degree to which our programs are *externally relevant*" (47; original emphasis), he is instructing us to engage in (to use Phelps's phrase again) a "complex nested set of dialogues" between these points of consideration.

Chase tells how he and his colleagues at Northern Arizona University overhauled the composition program there in order to do a better job with the available resources—resources that include, among other things, money, graduate assistantships, and a departmentally-funded and staffed writing center. One particular problem Chase and his colleagues sought to eliminate in their program was the heavy workload of his graduate teaching assistants. In the old, six-hour composition program (which consisted of a sequence of two three-hour classes), Chase's graduate students taught two sections of composition each semester in addition to taking nine graduate hours. In the new four-hour program (which consists of one four-hour class), graduate assistants teach one section of composition, as well as perform other duties, such as tutoring in the writing center. Chase was thus able to ensure that "a GA's teaching load could not easily be doubled should enrollment increase" (50). Implicit here is the idea that most unreflective teachers are unreflective because they lack the *time* to reflect: a decrease in workload should lead to an increase in time for reflection, which ought to result in better teaching. Another change he implemented with his graduate student teachers in mind was a common syllabus which he and the other composition specialists in his department prepared for use in the new four-hour class. About this change he notes:

We realized that if we were going to use these inexperienced students as the primary instructors in a required course, we had an obligation to provide as much guidance and support as we could. The standard syllabi helped do so by giving these graduate students a scaffolding. . . . [I]t provided a common experience for GA's so that they could work together as a community to address the challenges of teaching . . . [and] went a long way toward creating possibilities for focus and coherence. (51-52)

In his role as WPA, Chase understands the benefits of providing his graduate instructors time to reflect on the activity of teaching and in "creating possibilities for focus and coherence." In creating these conditions, he is shaping his school's curriculum in significant ways and doing so in accordance with a coherent philosophy.

Additionally, in NAU's new program, since GA's teach one section of composition instead of two, more GA's are available, as part of their regular duties, to staff the department's writing center and to work with writing-intensive courses in the disciplines. An important consequence of such a change in policy is that students in writing classes at all levels are provided with more direct contact with tutors, which enhances the *social* nature of the writing pedagogy across campus. This promotion of a social pedagogy was fundamental to progressive era educational reforms: it increases students' opportunities for exposure to "scientific" (as opposed to "authoritarian") instruction, which provides more opportunities for students to engage in the "reconstruction of experience" (Dewey) through dialogue with others about their writing.³ Because it creates the conditions that provide a higher incidence of a "pedagogy of direct intervention" (North) for writers, Chase's new program does a better job promoting reflection and is thus more in keeping with Dewey's ideas.

Another example of a WPA's endeavors being aimed at promoting reflection can be found in Shirley K. Rose and Margaret J. Finders' use of "situated performance activities" in their training of teaching assistants and pre-service high school teachers. These activities, which ask students in teacher-training classes to place themselves in the role of a teacher or a student in an imaginary classroom situation, are a form of experiential learning that the authors refer to as "'fictional' experience" (33). As Rose and Finders explain,

Situated performance is both an imaginative activity and an interpretive one. The participants imaginatively construct a situation, using the resources of their experiences of and assumptions about the ways people can or should behave. These imaginative creations are based on interpretations of situations. In turn, the performance itself is open to interpretation (36)

These exercises are risk-free opportunities for experiential learning, situations that allow the participants to reflect on and imagine ways to revise

their actions. Because students physically act out these classroom mini-dramas, they come to a fuller understanding of their roles and the roles of others involved. "By imagining and stepping into a teacher position," Rose and Finders say, preservice teachers "can try out different teaching stances and think through a sequence of events" (44). And by playing the part of a student in such exercises, beginning teachers can also come to a fuller understanding of more nuts-and-bolts issues like "course-design and lesson planning" by seeing how a particular assignment or classroom activity might be received by students (44).

By providing teachers-in-training with experiential learning activities and productive opportunities to reflect on these activities, Rose and Finders act in a way that is in keeping with Dewey's insistence that an education, in order to promote social change, must be concerned with *present experiences*. Chase, too, takes certain actions out of concern for the present experiences of the GA's who teach in his program and for the students in those GA's classes. His actions are designed to positively influence his instructors' actions (their pedagogy), which will in turn positively influence students' actions (their writing and how they approach writing tasks), both in the present and in the future. The problem with teacher-centered, lecture-style methods of schooling," Dewey says, is that they "tend to sacrifice the present to a remote and more or less unknown future" (*Experience* 49). That is:

Because the studies of the traditional school consisted of subject matter that was selected and arranged on the basis of the judgement of adults as to what would be useful to the young sometime in the future, the material to be learned was settled upon outside the present life-experience of the learner. In consequence, it had to do with the past; it was such as had proved useful to men in past ages. (Dewey, Experience 76-77)

An unfortunate result of this method of schooling is that "it comes to be believed that the educator has little responsibility for the kind of present experiences the young undergo" (Dewey, *Experience* 49). As the "Intellectual Work Document" suggests, however, WPAs prevail upon the present experiences of students in innumerable ways.

Sometimes, though, the predominant attitude of non-compositionists across campus is that composition has little to do with students' present experiences—that it is instead a "service" course. Jasper Neel gives voice to this stance when he notes that the work of composition instructors is often

seen as wholly “transformative”: their task is “‘preparing’ students for the challenging work that lies ahead” in other classes (80). When such a view persists, Neel laments, the consequence is that the job of composition instruction becomes “[l]ike any other type of housekeeping”: it “remains always to do,” and so “by definition it cannot be done.” And something that is never done, alas, “can never be described as having been done well” (80). When composition is understood to be a “service” course, it becomes easy to see the administration of a composition program as performing “service,” something that always needs to be done, like advising students or ordering books for the library. But teaching and scholarship always need to be done, too, and when we see our jobs instead through the lens of Phelps’s characterization of composition instruction—as a complex, “experimental” activity—we see composition and the job of a WPA as an intellectual undertaking that is concerned with action and reflection; we see it as a praxis.⁴

Neel’s characterization of composition-as-service helps, as well, to illustrate a distinction that is at the center of much of Dewey’s educational theory: that between “knowing” and “doing.” To the traditional way of thinking, Dewey says, “the higher the activity the more purely mental it is” and “the less [it has] to do with physical things or the human body” (*Democracy* 254). Thus, we tend to differentiate between, on the one hand, the thinker or theorist and, on the other, the practitioner who *applies* theory.

*[T]he free citizen who devotes himself to the public life of his community, sharing in the management of its affairs and winning personal honor and distinction, lives a life accompanied by reason. But the thinker, the man who devotes himself to scientific inquiry and philosophic speculation, works, so to speak, in reason, not simply by it. Even the act of the citizen in his civic relations, in other words, retains some of the taint of practice (Dewey, *Democracy* 254; original emphasis)*

Dewey plainly disdains this state of affairs, this subordination of “doing” to “knowing,” and so should we, for it is this same “taint of practice” that holds sway against composition instruction and the work of WPAs. Hence, less value is assigned to the social pedagogy of the composition, where *doing* is a priority of the teacher, than to the more teacher-centered pedagogy of other classes, where *knowing* or displaying knowledge is a priority of the teacher. But when we consider the activities

of somebody like Chase in light of his obvious disciplinary knowledge, and when we see the steps he takes to provide a more beneficial learning environment to both the instructors and the students in the composition program he oversees, we see that the dichotomy between “knowing” and “doing” is a false one.

Mead argues the pragmatist point-of-view succinctly when he asserts that there is really “no fundamental distinction” between the research methods of professionals in different academic fields: “Each is approaching problems that must be solved, and to be solved must be presented in the form of carefully gathered data. For their solution hypotheses must be constructed and tested by means of experiment and observation. With the complexity of the phenomena, of course, the application of the scientific methods will vary” (61). While this description of an active method of problem-solving clearly suits the term “research” as it is understood in the hard sciences, it also stands in for “teaching composition,” where the “problems” at hand are student writers and their texts, to which professionals in composition apply their own disciplinary knowledge. When we see the teaching of composition and the work of WPAs in the context of pragmatist concerns over solving immediate problems and over a self-awareness of action through reflection, our professional tasks—and our professional identities—benefit by association.

Notes

1. Among the interesting revisions to the wording of the “Intellectual Work Document” from the draft [WPA (Fall/Winter 1996)] to the final version is the last sentence of the opening paragraph. The 1996 draft argues that WPA work “is worthy of promotion and tenure when it both produces and enacts disciplinary knowledge . . .” (92). The word “produces” is revised to “advances” in the final version (85), a word that connotes a slightly different relationship to its object (“disciplinary knowledge”), suggesting that knowledge is less a *static* entity (something to be produced) than it is a *dynamic* and *functional* entity.
2. The quote from Rorty only begins to suggest the differences between the “pragmatism” of John Dewey and philosophers of his era and the brand of “neo-pragmatism” forwarded by Rorty, Donald Davidson, and other contemporary philosophers. But as Roskelly and Ronald note, a level of theorizing about *language* is a key “differentiating factor between pragmatism and neopragmatism” (114). They quote Diggins, who

explains, "Whether the point of traditional philosophy was to interpret the world or to change it, the point of 'post-philosophy' is to find ways of legitimizing what we say instead of proving what we know" (114).

3. In the work cited by Fishman, he provides an example to illustrate the benefits of a social pedagogy—the use of writing groups—and to suggest how working with others to construct a "new text" results in the "construction of a new self" (326).
4. Diggins explains that while pragmatism is primarily a future-oriented philosophy in the sense that "the meaning and significance of the present await the future" (20), a desirable future cannot be attained without conscious attention to present experience.

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